Criminal organizations and safety matters in Latin America

In a historic move, 18 countries from Latin America and the Caribbean came together in December 2024 to launch the Alliance for Security, Justice, and Development. The initiative, spearheaded by the Inter-American Development Bank, aims to tackle the pervasive issue of organized crime and its impact on the region.

The alliance focuses on three main pillars: protecting vulnerable populations, strengthening security and justice institutions, and reducing illicit markets and financial flows. The participating countries, including the Organization of American States, Interpol, the World Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean, are committed to promoting evidence-based policies and implementing concrete actions.

However, the road ahead is challenging. The most likely scenario is that organized crime and its role in corruption and violence will remain a fixture of Latin America's political, social, and economic landscape, though with significant regional variations. The underlying drivers of criminality - widespread poverty, low investment in education, and limited job opportunities - persist, making the large profits from narco-trafficking and other organized crimes more enticing.

Given the political and social pressures favoring immediate security, there is limited evidence to suggest that leaders in Latin America or their constituents are inclined to take this step. Yet, the alliance hopes to change this narrative by demonstrating tangible results in protecting vulnerable populations and reducing illicit activities.

The transnational nature of these threats, compounded by the absence of a permanent collective security institution in the region, makes fighting organized crime a Sisyphean task. Reductions in foreign assistance from President Donald Trump's administration are likely to exacerbate this trend by limiting the U.S.'s willingness and capacity to engage in security cooperation and support soldiers, police, prosecutors, and judges in Latin America.

Certain jurisdictions, such as Medellin in Colombia, have experimented with hybrid strategies that combine community-based prevention programs with targeted law enforcement operations. These strategies, while not foolproof, have shown promise in reclaiming space and building trust among citizens.

Countries farthest from the drug-trafficking chain, such as Uruguay and Chile, or those with more independent judiciaries, like Brazil, are likely to fare better. However, Mexico and parts of Central America will remain particularly vulnerable due to their geographical proximity to the drug-producing regions.

The most optimistic scenario is the least likely. For a blanket improvement to take place, a regional effort is needed to enhance governance capabilities, coordinate security responses, eliminate ungoverned areas, and ensure judicial independence to effectively investigate corruption and prosecute criminals. A second possibility is that, as criminal networks expand and become more transnational, organized crime continues to spread, leading to increased violence and deteriorating security.

Public support for security militarization will persist only as long as the security situation improves; otherwise, the "loss of rights for security" trade-off loses appeal. Social investment in marginalized neighborhoods, as seen in Medellin's urban development initiatives, can help in reclaiming space and building trust among citizens.

The alliance's success will depend on its ability to adapt to the evolving nature of organized crime and to find solutions that address the root causes of criminality. Only then can Latin America hope to overcome the scourge of organized crime and build a safer, more prosperous future for its people.